

Global Issues

Limits of the 'social pact' in Brazil

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ABSTRACT

The present article analyzes the June 2013 demonstrations that took place in many cities in Brazil, arguing that ultimately they expose the limits of the 'social pact' promoted by Lula since his 2002 presidential campaign. Problems and contradictions in different spheres of the Brazilian society are brought into light to argue that the 'social pact' has reached its limits and that structural changes are needed if it is to deepen social justice and economic growth. The recent protests and informal online organized mobilizations pose new challenges not only to the Federal Government, but to political parties and the labor movement itself, especially in the face of the upcoming 2014 presidential elections.

KEYWORDS

Brazil, democracy; labor movement; politics, social movements.

Back in 2002, when Lula was elected President in his fourth attempt, he did so by presenting his candidacy with a moderate government platform, based on the now famous 'Letter to the Brazilian People' (a document that actually contained clear messages to reassure the financial markets that there would be no economic rupture). At that time, it was no wonder he was referred to in the press as '*Lula light*', '*Little Lula peace and love*' and the Worker's Party (PT), as '*Pink PT*', in opposition to the more red, radical leftist discourse presented in the previous three elections. Dancing according to the music set by his sharp marketing advisor, Duda Mendonça, Lula made use of one of his most memorable catchphrases in that election: only he would be able to perform a true '*social pact*' that would put an end to Brazil's critical socioeconomic situation experienced at the end of the second term of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso's administration (Party of Brazilian Social Democracy, PSDB). The idea, '*hope overcame fear*'¹, caught on and Lula finally won the Presidency.

The concrete expression that would give a 'face' to the symbolic driving idea of Lula's social pact was the creation of the Council for Economic and Social Development (CDES), composed of nationalist businessmen who supported Lula (dissatisfied with economic liberalization promoted by previous administrations), various NGOs and social movements, trade union centers, student organizations; the Church through the Brazilian Conference of Bishops (CNBB); major construction companies like Odebrecht; the São Paulo State Industrial Federation (FIESP), among many others. The social pact then began to have a name and address.

For approximately ten years, three different governments led by the PT-PMDB (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement) alliance fulfilled the complex promise of pleasing both Greeks and Trojans: while about 40 million people were lifted out of extreme poverty, the financial system hit record profitability. While unemployment remains relatively low at around 5%-6% (even in times of global crisis), the landowner agribusiness has been strengthened as a key pillar of an extractive economy based on exports of low value-added commodities.

At the same time that it has created an important political appreciation of the real minimum wage, large infrastructure projects have provoked strong environmental and social damage. While thousands of young people aged between 18 and 24 years managed to enter the formal labor market, 94% of their jobs pay 'only' up to 1,000 Reais per month (Braga, 2013). When pressed by the global crisis in 2009, the Government exempted companies from the Industrial Production Tax (IPI), absorbing the cost and stimulating the domestic consumption market. The illustrations for this ambiguous socioeconomic context could follow almost endlessly. The policy of the social pact sought to reconcile the irreconcilable - and for quite some time it did so successfully.

Especially during Lula's two terms a huge effort was made to bring the diversity of society 'into' the government, to democratize the decision-making processes, particularly through the creation of National Councils and Thematic Conferences, which institutionalized channels of participation in public policy formulation. 'Between 2003 and 2010, 74 national conferences were held, and out of these, 21 occurred once, nine had two editions, five had three editions, and five others had four editions. We had 74 conferences with 74 different themes. (...) We can say that during the Lula government, there was a lot of 'experimenting'. Different themes were put forward to be debated by society as whole, and this was positive because it mobilized various sectors of society to reflect on national issues' (Teixeira et al., 2012).

It should be emphasized, however, that participation in these areas mainly involved organized civil society, including youth groups not only from the student movement, but a multiplicity of groups, out of which some were more and some were less institutionalized. In this sense, nowadays there is a challenge posed to the ways through which political participation was originally channeled by the Lula government. This is so because, as pointed out by Romão (2013), there is a whole non-institutionalized (often individual) and virtual dimension (that occurs via the Internet) that must somehow be taken into account by the official structures of the political system.

Of course, this is not just a challenge for democracy in Brazil. Researchers at the Institute for the Future (itft.org), in San Francisco (USA), have been working on developing a mobile app to enable the direct participation of citizens in official politics. The idea is that the app will allow citizens to have transparent access to all the votes of Congressmen and that they will be able to interact with comments or participate in surveys about how the politician should vote on a particular matter or policy decision. There is a democratizing potential in the interface between politics and social networks around the world that we have barely begun to explore and, perhaps, we are underestimating.

Even taking into account the advances and limitations of the participation model practiced in the country, it can be said – at the risk of a slight exaggeration – that at least from 2003 to 2010 Brazil has lived under this kind of general tacit approval of the current model. Brazil changed its image and projection on the international stage, becoming much more active and respected than it was ever before (at the same time that it has taken a larger distance to the US influence on foreign policy). Over recent years, the image of the country as the 5th largest economy in the world has been complemented with that of a great 'peaceful' democracy where poverty reduction has indeed been achieved.

An important exception to this favorable context was the issue of corruption. This came to occupy a space in the media's political debate, especially after the 2005 '*Mensalão*' episode in which Lula's government officials were accused of paying a monthly allowance (*mensalão*) to Congressmen, in order to get enough votes to pass bills and approve progressive policies. That scandal was revealed in retaliation for an investigation of the Postal Service which had exposed other party's corruption schemes.

Despite that, the current political model of a Federal Government that has effective social policies which improve the lives of the poor, and at the same time does not cause extreme disruption to the elite's interests seemed to please the majority of Brazilian society. This is even more the case in the present context of more radicalized leftist political experiences going on in several Latin American countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, which traditionally tend to inspire fear and aversion in the Brazilian middle and upper classes.

In 2010, relying on broad social approval of Lula's two terms, Dilma Rousseff's election was marked by the symbolic construction of her image as one of a 'competent manager', who had been Minister of Mines and Energy and the Presidency Chief of Staff. Dilma, 'the big efficient manager', would be the right person to keep the country on the path of social transformation without the 'charismatic deviations' attributed to Lula, improving the performance of public administration and favoring the so-called 'friendly environment for investment'. Roughly speaking, that was what she tried to do in her first two years in office, even though the external environment of financial crisis has made it difficult to obtain significant results.²

Nobody predicted that in June 2013 large street demonstrations would erupt across Brazil. However, today it is possible to note that before it happened many smaller tensions were already setting the scene: while in March 2013 polls showed a wide approval of Dilma's government (79%)³ – meaning that the president had a higher chance to win in the 2014 elections first round – many other conflicts, grievances, struggles, demands and aspirations were being settled and were pulsating with increasing force in several cities (Vainer, 2013). A relatively widespread discontent regarding the President's distancing and social insensitivity was growing even among the leftist traditional forces and government allies (Sousa Santos, 2013).

Some of the issues expressed during these conflicts can be interpreted as consequences of the recent acceleration in the development of Brazilian capitalism – following the always fertile analytical line of Francisco de Oliveira (2013) – and the deep changes that this acceleration is causing to the social tissue. New territorialities are rapidly being created in Brazil's largest cities, responding mainly to economic interests that privatize the space in favor of the flow of goods and capital. The impact of these movements on the territory can be seen in the demonstrations and riots that were pre-marking the context for the June protests, such as the construction of the Belo Monte hydroelectric plant on the Xingu River, the Jirau plant on the Madeira River and Suape Thermoelectric in Pernambuco state.

Add in to the scene conflicts between mining and agribusiness sectors with the Indians in the Amazon (among which the case of suicides committed by members of *Guaraní-Kaiowá* tribes have gained much media attention); the extreme violence of the Military Police (MP) of São Paulo in the expropriation of the *Pinheirinho* community in the nearby city of São José dos Campos, belonging to corrupt speculator Naji Nahas; the 'pacification by force' in strategic areas of slums in Rio de Janeiro and other cities in preparation for the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games; among other conflicts, and you have a thick – yet sort of invisible – broth of discontent underlying Brazilian society. Even in terms of the traditional labor unions, often accused of apathy, a strong increase in

the number of strikes have been observed throughout the country since the year 2008 (Braga, 2013) and continued throughout 2013.

Many more diffuse and invisible elements enhance the sense of social unrest. These included: recurrent cases of rapes of women in vans in Rio de Janeiro (divulged by the national press only after one of the victims was a foreign tourist); the spread of the use of crack in the big cities; gay community protests against evangelical preacher Feliciano as president of the Lower House Commission on Human Rights, because of his madly proposed 'gay cure' bill; discussions about reducing the age of criminal persecution...etc.

In early 2013, when new soccer stadiums began to be inaugurated before the FIFA Confederations Cup, no one was really surprised to see them as the target of demonstrations against the spending of public money in the organization of the World Cup. An event that in 2007 had been promised by Lula as 'the World Cup sponsored *by* the private initiative', but which effectively has proven to be 'the World Cup *to* the private profit'. The relatively invisible work of the National Coordination of Popular Committees for the World Cup and Olympics (ANCOP) played an important role in raising awareness and mobilizing communities affected by these mega-events (Vainer, 2013). The extremely violent action of the Military Police (MP) against indigenous communities on vacating the Indigenous People's Museum, located next to the Maracanã Stadium in Rio, is just one example among many.

Already in the very first game played between Brazilian soccer teams in new stadiums, the old violence that permeates Brazilian soccer fans in their clash with each other or with the Military Police, quickly emerged. In the brand-new 'Arenas' paid with public funds, the audience of the show is still treated like cattle and still reacts like hooligans.

In the 'chapter apart' regarding corruption, the year 2012 was marked by a spectacular overexposure of the *mensalão* trial in the major media, of which the climax coincided masterfully with the holding of municipal elections in October. Never before – and never after, the Federal Supreme Court (STF) had as much media attention as highlighted in this episode, taking the Court Ministers to the status of true pop stars. They were converted into heroes and antiheroes of a sort of novel, TV series, like a Big Brother show broadcasted 24 hours a day in the news channels.

When the politicians judged guilty at first instance were not placed immediately behind bars – since legally the process was still open – many 'fans' of this or that judge became angry with the anticlimax of Criminal Case 470 (the official name for the *mensalão* trial). As has occurred since 2005, the so called *mensalão* appeared as a major issue in the social networks, plus other events such as the Parliamentary Inquiring Commission (CPI) about the Cachoeira case⁴ (ended in nothing); protests against the election of Renan Calheiros (PMDB) for the Presidency of the Senate;⁵ and the underground transportation system mafia during the PSDB administrations in São Paulo state. Social networks then largely channeled this general indignation, both to the right and to the left.

The fact that in the 2012 municipal elections the Worker's Party (PT) suffered no loss of power even under the heavy media bombardment around the *mensalão* trial but, instead, went on to govern the largest city in the country, certainly contributed to a greater frustration for groups such as *Cansei!*,⁶ *Endireita Brasil*,⁷ and certain intellectuals gathered in policy centers such as the *Millennium Institute* and the *Garças House*.⁸ Important to note, these social groups were also on the streets in June, many of them singing the national anthem and chanting the chorus of '*Dilma out of office!*'.

The mobilization trigger of the June demonstrations, the Free Pass Movement (MPL), dates back to the coordination processes before and during the World Social Forum (WSF), the struggles against economic liberalization and specifically back to the year 2005, when in the cities of Salvador

(the *Buzu* revolt) and Florianópolis, strong protests took place against the increase in the bus fare and for the free pass (Romão, op. cit.). Several other MPL demonstrations occurred before 2013, without, however, appearing in the mainstream media and lacking capacity to expand and involve other social sectors.

Since June much analysis and discussion has been produced about the demonstrations in Brazil. It is important to recognize that one of the consequences of the demonstrations is that there has been an increase of public debate, breaking up a certain lethargic feeling. Whether it was in the universities, social movements, political parties, social networks, the press, informal bar discussions... all these areas were 'caught by surprise' by the events since June. There is now a revival of the debate on the direction Brazil is heading. This is positive.

We know from these various reflections that a major element in question is the performance of the Brazilian police. It was due to the excessive police crackdown on the Free Pass Movement demonstrations that demands for the reduction in the transport fee gained the sympathy of a larger part of the population. After severely injuring journalists of large media groups who were on duty covering the protests, public opinion moved against repression and tens of thousands took to the streets. The result was an embarrassing shift in the mainstream media discourse about the demonstrations.

The fundamental problem that this episode brought up was the brutal reality of police repression that constantly runs through Brazilian peripheries and the decay of the prison system. Already before, but especially after the wave of attacks by the *PCC* in 2006,⁹ the order for the MPs, ROTAs, BOPEs¹⁰ and alike is to shoot first and ask questions later. There are plenty of invisible '*Amarildos*' and '*Douglas*'¹¹ – innocent people killed daily in police actions.

According to Vieira (2013), 'data on violence in Brazil in these two last decades are alarming. Officially more than 900,000 people were victims of murder between 1990 and 2011. If we add about 130 thousand deaths not counted as detected by the IPEA¹² research, more than 1 million people were victims of homicide in our own everyday war. Such a figure is much higher than the American casualties in the Vietnam War or even the deaths in the Gulf War, or the Israel/Palestine conflict, which has lasted more than six decades'. Even the various complaints against Brazil at the United Nations Human Rights Council are unable and powerless to push for real change in this sad situation.

In such a context, the public security forces and prison system are some of the public institutions that have been on the margin of the 'virtuous cycle' of the last ten years: they continue with a military culture inherited from the dictatorship; they are still underpaid; operating in outdated facilities; highly bureaucratized; and continue operating with an essentially repressive bias that systematically violates the human rights of citizens, particularly the poor and the black. Violence is trivialized in the country. It became a daily experience and its very root, social inequality (not just economic), remains a deep problem of Brazilian society (Caccia Bava, 2013), even though it has recently mitigated extreme poverty. 'After 20 years of democracy, this Brazil intended protagonist of the great international scene has a duty to radically rethink its political culture of public security and to modify the perception today widely disseminated that the police is nothing more than the concrete expression of the general oppression of the State over its citizens' (Berrón, 2013).

The police are today among the institutions that have the lowest level of confidence from the population. Data from a recent survey developed by the School of Law at FGV¹³ indicates that 77% of the population earning less than two times the minimum wage (R\$ 1,356.00 in 2013 values)¹⁴ do not trust the police. Among the population with income levels between two and ten

times the minimum wage, the level of distrust varies between 65% and 63%. This disbelief reaches 59% of the population with an income of above 10 times the minimum wage. That means that the lower the income, the greater the mistrust of the police. Other important institutions of the Brazilian democracy thicken the chorus of distrust: the Judiciary system, with 42% of public confidence; the Federal Government, 40%; TV stations, with 33% confidence; neighbors, 30%; Congress, 22%; and national Political Parties in general with a measly 5% of confidence.

'It's not for 20 cents'. If the excessive repression by the police was perhaps the greatest catalyst element that turned various other groups and causes to be in solidarity with the Free Pass Movement, the qualitative leap of the demonstrations has been summarized in the slogan *'it's not for 20 cents'*.

When the demonstrations to block the bus fare increase by 0,20 Reais reached sufficient size and power to stop our cities, it then opened the possibility of establishing a deeper debate about urban mobility and the development model. The MPL accepted the challenge and faced debates in the media and with the public authorities stressing that the issue was beyond the 20 cents raise. Other dimensions of the community life were addressed, such as the urban mobility model, the power of the private mass transport companies, the issue of corporate financing for politicians, the brutal and undemocratic police repression, the privatization of public spaces, etc.

In the *'country of all'*,¹⁵ a significant part of society expressed (both to the right and to the left) that it does not intend to take part in the current political project. This will not change simply because the bus fare raise was canceled due to the street protests. Following the analytical line proposed by French philosopher Jacques Rancière (1996), the protests that emerged in June have created an authentic moment of *political misunderstanding*, a moment of *political dissent* within the Brazilian society. This moment of misunderstanding means that the political conflict between society and the public authorities has surpassed the mere economic demands and went ahead as a broader and deeper questioning about the direction and values of our own common social life, our own lifestyle. At that very moment the endurance of the past ten years' social pact initiated by Lula in the 2002 elections came into question.

It came into question because the population now demands more than what has been achieved so far. The State and public institutions are being called to be more present and more efficient, providing more and better public services (we should note here that these type of demands for a greater role of the State are far away from neoliberal policy solutions). Citizens want to see their Constitutional rights really respected in day to day life. Demonstrations have exposed quite clearly that many of the country's historical structural problems remain unresolved. To overcome them you need to defy strong political and economic interests, deeply rooted in both the public and the private sectors. And therein lies the real challenge.

As often occurs during protests, the streets were taken largely by the youth. As it also often happens, they were quickly called by the mainstream media as *'rebels without a cause'*, *'unemployed students'* or simply *'thugs, hooligans'*. In the case of the June demonstrations, however, a new element entered the scene, namely, the fact that the protesters were not - mostly - linked to the traditional political organizations such as the student movement, the labor movement, organized social movements, or partisan youths. The political forces, in the institutional left themselves, were very slow to understand what was going on and recognize the relevance of the mobilizations.

Some of the main characteristics of the protests were the absence of party flags, sound-equipped trucks or elder leaders speaking to the crowd from a higher platform; and opposition to political parties and institutions. Instead, creative joking slogans and chants written in hand-made individual paper posters like *'we've got out of Facebook'*,¹⁶ *'sorry for the inconvenience, we are changing*

the country’, or even ‘*oh, but what a shame, the bus fare is more expensive than marijuana*’ highlighted a further distinction of political culture with relation to the practices of the traditional left (and also to the traditional right itself). It is not our purpose in this paper to judge whether the demonstrations that began in June were more or less politicized than others, for each context has its own peculiarities and all forms of conflict are significant in themselves.

Following this analytical path proposed by Rancière, we observe a process in which individuals who appear in the political scene are always directly linked to the historical dimension of their life experience and through the conflict itself. They put forward political visions that were not recognized by the current *status quo*. These various forms of public performance of conflicts are referred to by Rancière as a variety of *forms of political subjectivation*.¹⁷

By *forms of subjectivation* we understand the production of acts, a forum and a capacity of enunciation that were not identifiable in a given field of experience, whose identification thus goes hand in hand with the reconfiguration of life experience (Rancière, 1996:47-48).

Since June, a big gap in the forms of *political subjectivation* of those involved in the institutional political field and those who are not (and maybe not even want to be in) became apparent in the public arena, causing a *misunderstanding* of major proportions, which reshaped the current field of Brazilian political experience. The difficulty of mayors, governors and the federal government in dealing with the situation, calling for police repression in response to democratic demands, is just a symptom of this mismatch. Another difficulty was encountered by the institutionalized civil society in the form of social movements, trade unions and NGOs attempting to have dialogue with non-institutional groups and forms of doing politics, which sometimes resulted in physical confrontation in the streets.

Sometimes differences in *forms of subjectivation* correspond to different generational experiences, especially when the historical context presents major changes. Perhaps it is not unreasonable to propose the hypothesis that the June demonstrations in Brazil put into play certain generation born in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These are largely people who did not experience many of the Brazilian major political events in recent history: the Military Dictatorship period or the Cold War; the ‘*Direct Elections Now!*’ movement for democracy; the ‘*Painted Faces*’ youth movement during former president Collor's impeachment; or even Lula's three defeats to the Presidency.

It is largely a generation born in a world with Internet and mobile phones, with a globalized financial capitalism, and with the war on terror. Finally, it is a generation that matured politically while the PT is in power, but being accused of corruption as any other party, which reinforces the perception that they are all ‘tarred with the same brush’, away from the ordinary people and concerned only with their business supporters (Brum, 2013).

President Dilma Rousseff, who in fact had the responsibility to give a political response to the protests beyond the tariff reduction promoted by local governors, reacted in an interesting way. She proposed far-reaching measures, some of which, such as the allocation of royalties from the pre-salt oil fields for Education and Health Care, and the ‘*More Doctors*’ program¹⁸ were successfully adopted in Congress. Others, like the Constituent Referendum for a Political Reform, have been captured by procedural maneuvers in Congress and almost did not get featured in major media, a sign showing the heavy gambling interests that this proposal threatened.¹⁹

While the President was responding with a proposal for political reform that touched on many of the major problems expressed in the demonstrations – among them the crucial issue of

public financing for political campaigns, closely linked to corruption schemes – there was almost no connection between the streets and the Presidency, between institutional and non-institutional fields. About this specific point, the interpretation of Garcia dos Santos (2013) is precise:

Dilma gave a political response that was absolutely crucial because it answered to a demand for more power from the movements in the streets, with something that broadened social participation in power. It was interesting, very enlightening, because doing such a proposal, the conservatives and the whole political class mobilized to boycott it, firstly turning it into a referendum so that nothing would happen. These sectors were playing their expected role, but the ones who were not playing their role were the demonstrators who had called for more power and, when you have the ultimate authority of the State waving and saying, ‘Come on’, the other side did not respond. There were no demonstrations in favor of these proposals, or an understanding of the significance of that political gesture. Sectors in the right immediately knew how to read what was at stake, and the protesters did not.

As pointed out by Ortellado (2013), the events that took place from June on showed an experimental quest for both concrete results and an intense practice of autonomous political processes guided by direct democracy and horizontality principles. With regard to results, ‘in the final moments of the campaign against the bus fee increase, the fight was stormed by the broadcasting media conservative agenda. When the fee increase was reversed, the agitation remained orphaned and the dispersion of demands took over the process’.

From this point on, several sparse and fragmented demonstrations have taken over the streets and the political scene. Black bloc groups have joined the demonstrations and started to gain prominence in the mainstream press, which traditionally uses the issue of strategic violence and anonymity of these groups to take the focus off the real issues that mobilize the protests. It has been so for a long time, in Brazil and abroad. Also, after the reversion of the tariff increase, mobilizations began to occur mainly in the suburbs and road blockages became more frequent. The police started to strongly crack down on the demonstrations again, bringing the debate on police violence back to the scene.

Perhaps it is possible to say, following the analytical line opened by Garcia dos Santos, that the June movements may have kept the ‘small’ victorious outcome (reversion of the increase in bus and subway fees) but they missed the opportunity to conquer the greater result that was within reach: political reform. Still, there are undoubtedly important legacies from the June, July, August, September... protests. Important political processes of direct democracy and anti-capitalism were renewed; new actors who were not tied to traditional political forces on the left appeared on the public scene; an interesting field of reflection on the political and social networks has been opened; the debate about the police action became visible again; the Brazilian development model and our democratic life itself were questioned on their very structural contradictions.

The limits of the 2002 ‘social pact’ are now exposed for everyone to see. It is difficult to say to what extent the institutional political field will be able to reconcile with the demands and practices from the streets. It will be a challenge that involves not only government and political parties, but also the labor movement, whose relation with non-institutional youth groups should be revised. Looking up to an important year, 2014, that will host Presidential elections and the FIFA World Cup, the fact is that the direction that the Brazilian society will decide to follow in the near future will have some of its roots placed in the demonstrations that began in June 2013.

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NOTES

1. Another famous catchphrase used by Lula during the 2002 Presidential campaign.
2. Brazilian recent GDP has been of 7,5% (2010); 2,7% (2011); 0,9% (2012); and 2,3% (2013). Source: Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE).
3. *Source*: IBOPE Institute / National Confederation of Industry.
4. Famous lawbreaker who has links with many politicians in illegal business and money evasion schemes.
5. Calheiros is involved in various corruption scandals, however has never been claimed guilty.
6. *Cansei!* Movement (I'm tired!) was created in 2006 by some of Brazilian famous artists, actors, sportsman, intellectuals and politicians. Its objective is to promote a debate on the lack of ethics in politics, targeting the Worker's Party Administration in particular.
7. *Endireita Brasil* Movement is an elitist right wing movement that advocates for the emergence of a 'new right' in Brazil. Its core principles are: 1. *Individual liberties over Collective interest*. 2. *Free initiative and Free market*. 3. *Respect to the law, contracts and private property*. 4. *Limited Government*. 5. *Solid moral and ethical values*. 6. *Democratic State ideals and principles*.
8. The *Millennium Institute* and the *Garças House* are two Brazilian right wing think-tanks.
9. PCC – First Command of the Capital is the name of a widespread organized crime faction involving criminals operating from within various prisons and orchestrating attacks against police stations, particularly in the city of São Paulo.
10. Names of police elite groups in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.
11. Amarildo, a construction worker, and Douglas, a little boy, are two innocent people that were assassinated by the police during actions in the slums of Rio and São Paulo in the second semester of 2013.
12. IPEA – Institute for Applied Economic Research, a Federal body.
13. FGV – Getúlio Vargas Foundation, a private university.

14. Around 574 US Dollars, as of Jan/2014.
15. Slogan used in the Government's propaganda pieces under Lula's administration.
16. In Brazil, the June demonstrations were the first of its kind to succeed in mass mobilizing through Facebook networking.
17. '*Forms of political subjectivation*' are the processes through which people emerge from their common sense social positions of daily life to play active roles in the political scene. E.g. A woman, through her *political subjectivation process*, might become a feminist activist; or a regular worker, might become a trade union leader.
18. The '*More Doctors*' program allowed foreign doctors to legally work in Brazil, receiving wages from the Government, especially in distant areas of the country or in places with lack of doctors in big cities' peripheries.
19. It's relevant to note that the PT is one of the few parties that advocates exclusive public financing of election campaigns, together with some small radical leftist ones. Conservative forces oppose this proposition.

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